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I. INTRODUCTION
N THE SPRING of 2010, two major events occurred that im-
pacted the airline industry. The first was the U.S. Department
of Transportation's (DOT) adoption of rules to protect passen-
gers in the event of tarmac delays, specifically titled "Enhancing
Airline Passenger Protections," which became effective on April
29, 2010.' The second event was the volcanic ash cloud, created
by the eruption of Iceland's Eyjafjallaj6kull volcano, which shut
down the majority of European airspace in April of 2010.2 This
article examines each of these events and the effect-both im-
mediately and over a longer term-they had on the industry.
II. NEW TARMAC DELAY RULE (TDR)
In April 2010, the DOT's new rules on tarmac delay times and
other passenger protections took effect.3 Although the regula-
tions faced adversity and criticism, data from the last seven
I Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,983, 68,983 (Dec.
30, 2009) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 234, 253, 259, 399).
2 See Iceland Volcano Eruption of 2010 (EyjafJallajokull Volcano), N.Y. TIMES, http:/
/topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/iceland/
eyjafjallajokull/index.html (last updated Apr. 20, 2010).
3 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. at 68,983.
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months indicates that the rule has served its intended purpose.
The following discussion addresses the substance of the regula-
tions, the events that led to their promulgation, the predicted
outcome, and the realized outcome.
A. THE EVENTS THAT TRIGGERED THE RULE
A series of highly publicized incidents where travelers were
left on the tarmac for long periods of time triggered the DOT's
new rule.4 The first highly publicized incident occurred inJanu-
ary 1999, when Detroit, Michigan, was hit by a massive snow-
storm and "Detroit Metro Airport was blanketed with snow and
ice."' Passengers on Northwest Airlines's airplanes were physi-
cally stranded on the tarmac for approximately six hours.6 At
6:00 p.m. on January 3, the airline instructed passengers to
board the aircraft; but, after the doors closed, the plane never
took off, and passengers were repeatedly instructed to remain
seated with their seat belts fastened.7 The flight remained
parked on the tarmac for approximately six hours before the
airline cancelled the flight and the passengers finally deplaned.8
The second incident occurred in December 2006; severe
thunderstorms in Dallas, Texas, resulted in multiple flights be-
ing diverted to surrounding airports and left on the runway for
several hours.9 One plane, on its way from Oakland, California,
to Dallas, Texas, was diverted to Austin, Texas.10 The plane
landed in Austin around noon, refueled, began to taxi to the
runway, but then stopped short.11 The pilot informed the pas-
sengers that the Dallas airport closed due to bad weather. 12 Ap-
proximately an hour later, passengers were informed that a bus
was available to take those who wished to deplane to the Austin
airport terminal. 13 One passenger alleged that the pilot recom-
4 See David A. Berg, DOT's New Deplaning Rule: A Recipe for Consumer Disruption,
Not Protection, 23 No. 1 AIR & SPACE LAW. 17, 17-18 (2010).
5 Sousanis v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. C-99-2994 MHP, 2000 WL 34015861, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2000); Berg, supra note 4, at 17.
6 Sousanis, 2000 WL 34015861, at *1.
7 Id. at *1-2.
8 Id.
9 See Ray v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 609 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2010); Hanni v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., No. C 08-00732 CW, 2010 WL 289297, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15,
2010).
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mended they stay onboard and told them that the plane would
likely be leaving in an hour or so. 14 Another two to three hours
passed with the plane on the tarmac, and passengers were again
offered the opportunity to deplane and head back to the airport
terminal.15 The airline provided no further opportunities to
deplane for the next six to seven hours. 6 One passenger re-
ported that the conditions in the plane "deteriorated" from that
point and claimed that "the air became 'stuffy' and 'smelly.' "17
The only food and drinks supplied to passengers were "two or
three granola bars" and two soft drinks. 8 At least one of the
plane's bathrooms eventually filled with waste and stopped
flushing. 9 Around 6:00 p.m., the pilot informed the passengers
that "he was no longer able to fly the plane because he had
reached his maximum duty hours," but due to lightning in the
Austin area causing ground crews to shut down, the plane was
not taken to the gate until 9:00 p.m.20 "Many of the passengers
... spent the night in the [airport] terminal. 21
Another highly publicized event happened in February 2007.
"More than 1,000 passengers on nine different flights" were kept
on the tarmac for hours at John F. Kennedy International Air-
port in New York during a snowstorm.22 One flight sat on the
tarmac for nearly eleven hours.23 As with the December 2006
incidents in Texas, "[t] he air and toilets on the plane [became]
foul, and the passengers.., were given little or no information
about why they" could not deplane.24
Several lawsuits were filed in the wake of the three events de-
scribed above. A passenger on a Northwest Airlines flight dur-
ing the January 1999 snowstorm in Detroit, Michigan, sued the
airline for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, false imprisonment, negligence, and violations of Califor-
14 Id.







22 Tom Zeller Jr., Held Hostage on the Tarmac: Time for a Passenger Bill of Rights?,
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nia state statutes and asserted claims for declaratory and
injunctive relief.25 The claims were dismissed at summaryjudg-
ment.26 Two lawsuits, related to different flights, were filed in
connection with Dallas's 2006 thunderstorms.27 One suit was
dismissed on summary judgment, and the dismissal was affirmed
by the Eighth Circuit.28 In the other suit, the plaintiffs' claims
were dismissed through rulings on summary judgment and
12(b)(6) motions, but the court permitted the plaintiffs to
amend their complaint and cure some of the defects. 29 The
plaintiffs, however, chose not to amend and sought entry of final
judgment from the court so as to allow them to appeal without
delay.3 0
B. RULES TO ENHANCE THE PROTECTIONS
FOR AIRLINE PASSENGERS
The events in Detroit, Dallas, and New York drove the de-
mand for a federal "passenger bill of rights" and put pressure on
the DOT to take action 1.3  As Congress debated legislation to
address the issue, the DOT published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM) on enhancing airline passenger protec-
tions on December 8, 2008.32 After reviewing and considering
the comments on the NPRM, on December 30, 2009, the DOT
published a final rule, "Enhancing Protections for Airline Pas-
sengers," the stated purpose of which is "to mitigate hardships
for airline passengers during lengthy tarmac delays and... bol-
ster air carriers' accountability to consumers. ' 33 The rule be-
came effective on April 29, 2010, and is found in 14 C.F.R. Part
259. 34
25 Sousanis v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. C-99-2994 MHP, 2000 WL 34015861, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2000).
26 Id. at *9.
27 See Hanni v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. C 08-00732 CW, 2010 WL 289297, at *1
(N.D. Cal.Jan. 15, 2010); Ray v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 08-5025, 2009 WL 921124,
at *1 (W.D. Ark. Apr. 2, 2009).
28 Ray v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 609 F.3d 917, 922, 927 (8th Cir. 2010).
29 Hanni, 2010 WL 289297, at *2.
30 Letter from Paul S. Hudson, Attorney for Plaintiffs, to Hon. Claudia Wilken,
Judge for the N. Dist. of Cal. (May 5, 2010) (available on PACER).
31 Berg, supra note 4, at 18.
32 See Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 73 Fed. Reg. 74,586 (proposed
Dec. 8, 2008) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 234, 259, 399).
33 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,983, 69,002 (Dec.
30, 2009) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 259).
34 See 14 C.F.R. § 259 (2011); Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed.
Reg. at 68,983.
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The "rule applies to all the flights of a certificated or com-
muter air carrier if the carrier operates scheduled passenger ser-
vice or public charter service using any aircraft originally
designed to have a passenger capacity of 30 or more seats," with
certain exceptions, and it requires the carriers to adopt contin-
gency plans for lengthy tarmac delays, respond to consumer
problems, post flight delay contingency plans on their websites,
and adopt, follow, and audit customer service plans. 5
1. Contingency Plans for Lengthy Tarmac Delays
Under the TDR, every certificated and commuter U.S. air car-
rier is required to adopt contingency plans in cases of long
tarmac delays "at each large and medium hub U.S. airport at
which it operates. "36 Among other things, each plan is required
to limit the number of hours an aircraft may sit on the tarmac
before passengers are permitted to deplane.3 7 When the rule
was published, Secretary of Transportation Ray LaHood ex-
plained that airlines which "do not provide food and water after
two hours or a chance to disembark after three hours," as re-
quired by the TDR, will face penalties of up to $27,500 per pas-
senger. 8 The rule provides some exceptions to the three hour
maximum tarmac delay: (i) if the pilot-in-command ascertains
that the plane must remain on the tarmac because of safety or
security reasons, or (ii) if air traffic control informs the pilot-in-
command that leaving the tarmac "to deplane passengers would
significantly disturb airport operations."39 Foreign carriers with
international flights arriving at or departing from U.S. airports
must also have contingency plans with a self-imposed time limit
for remaining on the tarmac.4 ° The same exceptions that per-
mit domestic flights to remain on the tarmac for longer than
authorized periods apply to international flights.4 '
The TDR requires the contingency plan to state that the air
carrier will provide the passengers with adequate food and pota-
ble water within two hours of the plane leaving the gate for de-
35 14 C.F.R. §§ 259.2, 259.4-.7 (2011).
36 Id. §§ 259.3-.4.
37 See id. § 259.4(b) (1).
3S Matthew L. Wald, Stiff Fines Are Set for Long Wait on the Tarmac, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 22, 2009, at Al; see also 14 C.F.R. § 259.4(b) (1), (3).
39 14 C.F.R. § 259.4(b)(1)(i)-(ii).
40 Id. § 259.4(b) (2).
41 Id. § 259.4(b) (2) (i)-(ii).
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parture or two hours of the plane touching down for arrival.42
An exception to this requirement exists in circumstances where
the pilot-in-command determines that security or safety reasons
prevent the provision.43 Additionally, all air carriers must assure
operating bathrooms and medical attention, if needed.44 Fail-
ure to comply with the contingency plan is considered to be an
unfair and deceptive practice and is subject to enforcement by
the DOT.45
2. Customer Service Plans
In addition to contingency plans for lengthy tarmac delays,
the TDR requires certificated and commuter air carriers to
adopt customer service plans applicable to their scheduled
flights. 4 6 Such plans are required to contain provisions:
(1) Offering the lowest fare available;
(2) Notifying customers of known delays, cancellations, and
diversions;
(3) Delivering baggage on time;
(4) Allowing reservations to be held without payment or can-
celled without penalty for a defined amount of time;
(5) Providing prompt ticket refunds;
(6) Properly accommodating passengers with disabilities and
other special-needs... ;
(7) Meeting customers' essential needs during lengthy tarmac
delays;
(8) Handling "bumped" passengers with fairness and consis-
tency in the case of over-sales;
(9) Disclosing travel itinerary, cancellation policies, frequent
flyer rules, and aircraft configuration;
(10) Ensuring good customer service from code-share partners;
(11) Ensuring responsiveness to customer complaints; and
(12) Identifying the services it provides to mitigate passenger in-
conveniences resulting from cancellations and misconnects.4 7
Each airline is also required to self-audit its adherence to the
customer service plan annually and maintain those audit
records for up to two years for review by the DOT.4 8
42 Id. § 259.4(b) (3).
43 Id.
44 Id. § 259.4(b) (4).
45 Id. § 259.4(e).
46 Id. § 25 9 .5(a).
47 Id. § 259.5(b).
48 Id. § *59.5 (c).
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3. Notice and Contract of Carriage
The DOT wanted to require carriers to include their contin-
gency plans and customer service plans in their contracts of car-
riage, but this proposal was met with resistance by industry
groups.49 A compromise was reached, and the rule instead re-
quires each airline with a website to post its contract of carriage,
including all updates to the contract, online in an accessible
form. ° If the carrier's contract of carriage does not include the
carrier's contingency plan for lengthy tarmac delays or the car-
rier's customer service plan, the carrier must then post the con-
tingency plan and/or customer service plan, including all
updates, on its website in easily accessible forms.5 1 InJune 2010,
the DOT proposed yet another rule that would require the con-
tingency plan for lengthy tarmac delay and customer service
plan to be included in the contract of carriage.52 After receiving
comments from the industry and interested groups about this
proposal, the DOT ultimately decided not to require U.S. and
foreign carriers to include their contingency plans and their cus-
tomer service plans in their contract of carriage.53 The DOT did
mandate that foreign air carriers post their tarmac delay contin-
gency plans, customer service plans, and contracts of carriage
on their websites.54
4. Response to Consumer Problems
The DOT's new regulations also address how air carriers are
to respond to consumer problems.55 Carriers are to designate
an employee to monitor the effects on passengers of flight de-
lays, flight cancellations, and lengthy tarmac delays. 56 "This em-
ployee shall have input into decisions on which flights to cancel
and which will be delayed the longest. ' 57 Each carrier is also
required to provide the mailing address and e-mail or web ad-
dress of the department that handles passenger complaints on
49 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,983, 68,998 (Dec.
30, 2009) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 234, 259, 399).
50 14 C.F.R. § 259.6(b).
51 14 C.F.R. § 259.6(c)-(d).
52 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,318, 32,318 (pro-
posedJune 8, 2010) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 234, 244, 250, 253, 259, 399).
53 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110 (Apr. 25,
2011) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 244, 250, 253, 259, 399).
54 Id.
55 See 14 C.F.R. § 259.7.
56 Id. § 259.7(a).
57 Id.
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its website, on e-ticket confirmations, and, if requested by a pas-
senger, at each ticket counter and boarding gate staffed by the
air carrier.58 And when a carrier receives a complaint-defined
as "a specific written expression of dissatisfaction concerning a
difficulty or problem ... experienced when using or attempting
to use an airline's services"-the carrier is to acknowledge re-
ceipt of the complaint within thirty days and provide a substan-
tive response within sixty days.59
The DOT also focused on the regulation of certain flight
schedules and chronically delayed flights in its efforts to provide
passenger protection. "The holding out of a chronically delayed
flight for more than four consecutive one-month periods repre-
sents one form of unrealistic scheduling and is an unfair or de-
ceptive practice and an unfair method of competition within the
meaning of 49 U.S.C. 41712" and is subject to enforcement by
the DOT.60 "Chronically delayed flight" is defined as any do-
mestic flight, operating at least ten times a month, that arrives
more than thirty minutes late more than fifty percent of the
time during that month.6 ' Chronically delayed flights include
cancelled flights. 62
C. THE ANTICIPATED RESULTS OF THE REGULATION
When the TDR was proposed, it was met with skepticism and
predictions that, rather than helping passengers, it would in-
crease the likelihood that passengers would face flight delays,
cancellations, and general inconvenience. 6' However, many of
the concerns voiced by the airline industry to the DOT's pro-
posed rule were alleviated in the final rule. For example, air-
lines were concerned with the initial deadline of only thirty days
to respond to customer complaints. 64 The Air Transport Associ-
ation of America (ATA) proposed a thirty-day acknowledgement
and a sixty-day deadline to respond.6 This suggestion was incor-
porated into the final rule under section 259.7(c). 66 In addi-
58 Id. § 259.7(b).
59 Id. § 259.7(c).
60 Id. § 399.81 (c) (4).
61 Id. § 399.81 (c) (2).
62 See id.
63 See Steve Chapman, Don't Blame the Airlines, CHi. TRIB. (Dec. 24, 2009), http:/
/articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-12-24/news/091 2230706_ILpassengers-amer-
ican-airlines-air-travel.
64 See Berg, supra note 4, at 18.
65 Id.
66 14 C.F.R. § 259.7(c).
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tion, while airlines accepted the idea of developing contingency
plans and customer service plans, they opposed incorporating
those plans into their contracts for carriage. 6v The DOT argued
that the requirement would provide passengers a breach of con-
tract cause of action if the carrier failed to follow the plans.6"
The final rule contains a compromise, providing that "[e] ach air
carrier that is required to adopt a Contingency Plan for Lengthy
Tarmac Delays or a Customer Service Plan may include such
plans in their Contract of Carriage."69
The ATA also opposed the fixed deadline of three hours to
deplane passengers, arguing that it limited airline flexibility and
would lead to more cancellations and be a greater nuisance to
passengers. 70 Passenger advocacy groups, on the other hand, ar-
gued for a two-hour deadline. 71 Despite airline proclamations
that carriers would be forced to cancel flights to avoid civil pen-
alties even though passengers might be willing to risk extended
delays, the new rule was instated with the three-hour deadline.7 2
Commentary on the new rule suggested that the "bright line"
drawn by the DOT would lead to the unintended consequences
of passenger disruption and lengthy onboard delay.7 Objectors
argued that, while the rule allowed for the pilot-in-charge to
prolong tarmac times for safety or security, it did not take into
consideration a determination to stay on the tarmac because of
imminent departure. 4 It was also contended that, at certain
large airports, taxi times between the gate and the runway can
take more than thirty minutes and, therefore, departing planes
will not be able to wait very long before the pilot must decide
whether to taxi back and deplane passengers.75 Flights forced to
return to the gate are more likely to be cancelled, and it was
67 Berg, supra note 4, at 18.
68 Id.
6- 14 C.F.R. § 259.6(a) (emphasis added). While the NPRM issued by the
DOT on June 8, 2010, would require such plans to be included in the airline's
contract of carriage, see Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg.
32,318, 32,324 (proposedJune 8, 2010) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 234, 244,
250, 253, 259, 399), the DOT ultimately decided not to require it, see Enhancing
Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110 (Apr. 25, 2011) (to be codified
at 14 C.F.R. pts. 244, 250, 253, 259, 344).
70 Berg, supra note 4, at 18.
71 Bus. TRAVEL COALITION & FLYERS RIGHTS.ORG, PASSENGER RIGHTS STAKE-
HOLDER MEETING 13 (2009).
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anticipated that airlines would begin to preemptively cancel
flights when there is doubt as to the ability to depart within
three hours.7 6 Overall, the arguments against the TDR alleged
that it would create problems for passengers rather than allevi-
ate them.
D. THE ACTUAL RESULTS OF THE REGULATION
While there are only seven months of data available on the
subject, the TDR was being hailed a success. 7 Data shows that
at least one of the DOT's goals-to prevent passengers from be-
ing held on the tarmac for over three hours-has been fulfilled
by the new rule.78
Table One
Tarmac Times of More Than 3 Hours70
268
183 161
85 85 74 66 60
II4 40 34 3420 2
4 F I II 4 4 3 3 1 4 0 0
C) Z C1 -) -o C. A ;gF. . -tc 0C N
Between May 2009 and November 2009-before the TDR was
effective-550 planes were reported to have sat on the tarmac
for three hours or more."0 But since the TDR became effective,
there were only twelve cases of tarmac times of three hours or
more for the same May to November period of 2010.1
76 Id.
77 See Roger Yu, October Has No 3-Hour Flight Delays on Tarmacs, USA TO DAY, Dec.
8, 2010, at 4B, available at http://ravel.usatoday.com/flights/2010-12-08-tarmac
delays08_ST_N.htm; Samantha Bomkamp, Tarmac Delay Rule Deemed Success After 4
Months, ABcNEwS (Oct. 12, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id
=11860988.
78 Bureau of Transp. Stat., Tarmac Times, REs. & INNOVATIVE TECH. ADMIN.
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Table Two
Number of Flights Cancelled8 2
I 2009 0 2010
8282 8279 8170
6716 r I88
5618 5613 4754 5273 5275 272
May June July August September October November
It was predicted that, as a result of the TDR, flight cancella-
tions would increase because carriers would cancel flights rather
than risk incurring fines due to extended tarmac times." If one
were to look solely at the number of flights cancelled, one would
see an increase. For example, in May 2009, 4,792 flights were
cancelled while in May 2010, 6,716 flights were cancelled; thus,
1,924 more flights were cancelled in May 2010 than in May
2009.4 Overall, 6,093 more flights were cancelled from May
through November 2010 than from May through November
2009.85
82 See sources cited infra note 85.
83 See Berg, supra note 4, at 19.
84 Compare U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PRO-
CEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2009, 20 tbl.8 (2009), available
at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/July/200907ATCR.pdf, with
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR
TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2010, 20 tbl.8 (2010), available at http://
airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/July/2010JulyATCR.pdf.
85 Compare U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PRO-
CEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2009, 20 tbl.8 (2009), available
at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/July/200907ATCR.pdf, U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL
CONSUMER REPORT FOR JUNE 2009, 22 tbl.8 (2009), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/August/200908ATCR.pdf, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR JULY 2009, 20 tbl.8 (2009), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/September/200909ATCR.pdf, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR AUGUST 2009, 20 tbl.8 (2009), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/October/20091OATCR.pdf, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANsP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 2009, 20 tbl.8 (2009), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/November/200911ATCR.pdf, U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR OCTOBER 2009, 21 tbl.8 (2009), available at http://aircon-
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Table Three
Percentage of Flights Cancelled 6
M 2009 l 2010
1.49% 1.50% 1.43%
~~0.99% 0.99% 09% 0.99% 0.97%
-;a 0.72%
May June July August September October November
The number of flights cancelled alone, however, should not
determine whether airlines have reacted to the TDR by cancel-
ling more flights. The overall percentage of flights cancelled
(i.e., the relationship between those cancelled to those sched-
uled) should be utilized. An increase in the number of flights
scheduled will likely result in a parallel increase in the number
of flights cancelled; thus, analysis of the numbers of flights can-
celled alone is unlikely to be a true indicator of whether cancel-
lations have risen overall. In May 2009, .88% of flights were
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/December/200912ATCR.pdf, and U.S. DEP'T
OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 2009, 20 tbl.8 (2010), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/January/2010JANATCR.pdf, with U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2010, 20 tbl.8 (2010), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/July/2010JulyATCR.pdf, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP.,
OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER RE-
PORT FORJUNE 2010, 22 tbl.8 (2010), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/
reports/2010/August/201OAugustATCR.pdf, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF
AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR JULY
2010, 27 tbl.8 (2010), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/
September/201OSeptATCR.pdf, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION EN-
FORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR AUGUST 2010, 24
tbl.8 (2010), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/20l0/October/
201OOctoberATCR.pdf, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCE-
MENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 2010, 21
tbl.8 (2010), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/Novem-
ber/201ONovemberATCR.pdf, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION EN-
FORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR OCTOBER 2010,
20 tbl.8 (2010), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/De-
cember/201ODecemberATCR.pdf, and U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIA-
TION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR
NOVEMBER 2010, 20 tbl.8 (2011), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/re-
ports/201 1/January/201 lJanuaryATCR.pdf.
86 See sources cited supra note 85.
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cancelled.87 In May 2010, 1.24% of flights were cancelled.88
Thus, there was only a .36% increase in flight cancellations be-
tween May 2009 and May 2010. For the seven-month period
from which there is data, there has been only a .14% increase in
the percentage of flights cancelled from May through Novem-
ber 2010 than from May through November 2009.89
With regard to flight cancellation numbers, it should also be
noted that, unlike the clear and drastic drop in tarmac delay
incidents, month-to-month flight cancellation comparisons have
been variable. As shown in the table above, between 2009 and
2010, the month of May saw an increase of 1,924 flight cancella-
tions.9" In June, however, there were actually three fewer can-
cellations in 2010 than in 2009.91 The cancellation numbers
rose again in July, with 1,332 more flights being cancelled in
2010 than in 2009,92 but then dropped back down again in Au-
gust, where there were five fewer cancellations in 2010 than in
2009. Thus, flight cancellations cannot, at this time, be used
as a solid indicator of the success or failure of the TDR.
87 See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEED-
INGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2009, 20 tbl.8 (2009), available at
http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/July/200907ATCR.pdf (numbers
in report are rounded).
88 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS,
AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2010, 20 tbl.8 (2010), available at http://
airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/July/2010JulyATCR.pdf (numbers in re-
port are rounded).
89 See sources cited supra note 85.
90 Compare U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PRO-
CEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2009, 20 tbl.8 (2009), available
at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/July/200907ATCR.pdf, with
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR
TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2010, 20 tbl.8 (2010), available at http://
airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/July/2010JulyATCR.pdf.
91 Compare U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PRO-
CEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FORJUNE 2009, 22 tbl.8 (2009), available
at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/August/200908ATCR.pdf, with
U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR
TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR JUNE 2010, 22 tbl.8 (2010), available at http://
airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/August/201OAugustATCR.pdf.
92 Compare U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PRO-
CEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FORJULY 2009, 20 tbl.8 (2009), available
at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/September/200909ATCR.pdf,
with U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS,
AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FORJULY 2010, 27 tbl.8 (2010), available at http://
airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/September/201SeptATCR.pdf.
93 Compare U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PRO-
CEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR AUGUST 2009, 20 tbl.8 (2009), avail-
able at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/October/20091OATCR.pdf,
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Table Four
Percentage of Flights On-Time94
W 2009 03 2010
88.89%
86.17% 07 83 77% [ 83.16 %
80.49% 79.94% 7 .8 81.65% 7727%
76.12 76.42% _ 76.6 % 77.2
May June July August September October November
From May through November 2010, 80.97% of flights were on
time. 5 For that same period of the previous year, 80.85% of
flights were on-time.9 6 Thus, there was a .12% increase in the
with U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS,
AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR AUGUST 2010, 24 tbl.8 (2010), available at
http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/201O/October/201 OOctoberATCR.pdf.
94 See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
95 See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEED-
INGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2010, 4 tbl.1 (2010), available at
http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/July/201OJulyATCR.pdf; U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL
CONSUMER REPORT FOR JUNE 2010, 4 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/August/201OAugustATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR JULY 2010, 4 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/September/201OSeptATCRpdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR AUGUST 2010, 4 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/October/201OOctoberATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 2010, 4 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/201O/November/2O1ONovemberATCR.pdf; U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL
CONSUMER REPORT FOR OCTOBER 2010, 4 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/201O/December/201ODecemberATCR.pdf; U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL
CONSUMER REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 2010, 4 tbl.1 (2011), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2011 /January/201 1JanuaryATCR.pdf.
96 See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEED-
INGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2009, 4 tbl.1 (2009), available at
http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/July/200907ATCR.pdf; U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL
CONSUMER REPORT FOR JUNE 2009, 4 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/August/200908ATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR JULY 2009, 4 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/September/200909ATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
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percentage of on time flights. In sum, it appears that, to date,
the TDR has had a negligible effect on the number of on-time
flights as well as the percentage of flights cancelled. What has
seen drastic reduction is the number of flights that sat on the
tarmac for over three hours, which dropped from 550 to 12." It
appears that the TDR, at least as of now, is deserving of its re-
cent praise. Some hypothesize that airlines and airports have
simply made operational adjustments in response to the TDR
and, thus, have not had to unnecessarily cancel flights.9"
When contacted in November 2010, the DOT informed the
authors that, of the eight tarmac delay incidents during May
through August 2010, the DOT closed three with warning let-
ters.9 9 Those cases apparently "involved tarmac delays of two,
three, and five minutes over the three-hour threshold," and ex-
tenuating circumstances existed in some of those instances. 00
"The remaining five cases [were] still open and under investiga-
tion." 10 1 As of August 2011, no airline had been fined the
threatened $27,500 per passenger for violations. 10 2 And to date,
there have been no chronically delayed flights for four consecu-
tive months or more. 10 3
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR AUGUST 2009, 4 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/October/200910ATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 2009, 4 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/November/20091 1ATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR OCTOBER 2009, 4 tbl.1 (2009), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2009/December/200912ATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 2009, 4 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://aircon-
sumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/January/2010JANATCR.pdf.
97 Bureau of Transp. Stat., supra note 78; see also supra graphic accompanying
note 79.
98 See, e.g., Yu, supra note 77.
99 Email from Reference Services, U.S. Dep't of Transp., to author Gardner
(Nov. 1, 2010, 9:33 AM) (on file with author).
100 Id.
101 Id.
102 Roger Yu, Long Airport Tarmac Delays Up Again, Government Reports, USA To-
DAY, http://travel.usatoday.com/flights/story/2011 /08/Long-airport-tarmac-de-
lays-up-again-government-reports/49891250/1 (last updated Aug. 11, 2011).
103 See U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEED-
INGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR MAY 2010, 14 (2010), available at http://
airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/July/2010JulyATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF
TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CON-
SUMER REPORT FOR JUNE 2010, 14 (2010), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.
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E. ANOTHER PROPOSED RULE OFFERING ADDITIONAL
PASSENGER PROTECTIONS
On June 8, 2010, the DOT continued its efforts to improve
the air travel environment for passengers by issuing another
NPRM that would expand the scope of the TDR; strengthen the
rights of air travelers in the event of over-sales, flight cancella-
tions, and long delays; and ensure that passengers have accurate
and adequate information to make informed decisions when se-
lecting flights. 104 The DOT proposes to accomplish these objec-
tives by:
[(1) ] increasing the number of carriers that are required to re-
port tarmac delay information to the [DOT];
[(2)] expanding the group of carriers that are required to
adopt, follow, and audit customer service plans and establishing
minimum standards for the subjects all carriers must cover in
such plans;
[(3)] requiring carriers to include their contingency plans and
customer service plans in their contracts of carriage; ...
[(4)] enhancing protections afforded to passengers in oversales
situations; ...
[(5)] requiring carriers to notify consumers of optional fees re-
lated to air transportation and of increases in baggage fees;
[(6)] prohibiting post-purchase price increases;
[(7)] requiring carriers to provide passengers timely notice of
flight status changes such as delays and cancellations; and
[(8)] prohibiting carriers from imposing unfair contract of car-
riage choice-of-forum provisions.
1 0 5
gov/reports/2010/August/201OAugustATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF TNSP., OFFICE
OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR
JULY 2010, 14 (2010), available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/
September/2010SeptATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp., OFFICE OF AVIATION EN-
FORCEMENT & PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR AUGUST 2010, 14
(2010), available at h ttp: //airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/ reports/ 201 O/October/2010
OctoberATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT &
PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR SEPTEMBER 2010, 14 (2010),
available at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/201O/November/20ONo-
vemberATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSp., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT &
PROCEEDINGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR OCTOBER 2010, 14 (2010), avail-
able at http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2010/December/20lODecember
ATCR.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF AVIATION ENFORCEMENT & PROCEED-
INGS, AIR TRAVEL CONSUMER REPORT FOR NOVEMBER 2010, 14 (2011), available at
http://airconsumer.ost.dot.gov/reports/2011/January/2011JanuaryATCR.pdf.
104 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 75 Fed. Reg. 32,318, 32,318 (pro-
posedJune 8, 2010) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 234, 244, 250, 253, 259, 399).
105 Id.
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In addition, the DOT is considering several measures, includ-
ing banning the serving of peanuts on commercial airlines to
provide greater access to travel for those individuals with peanut
allergies.1 °6 The DOT issued a final rule in the spring of 2011




While the new TDR was met by the airline industry and others
with opposition and skepticism, the results so far indicate that it
has been successful to the extent that it sought to reduce the
number of flights with tarmac times over three hours.
III. THE VOLCANIC ASH CLOUD OVER
EUROPEAN AIRSPACE
On March 20, 2010, the Eyjafjallaj6kull volcano in Iceland be-
gan erupting.108 Volcanic ash spewed into the air and formed a
large cloud that was carried by winds over Europe. 109 As a result
of this ash plume, the majority of European airspace became a
no-fly zone from April 15 through April 22, 2010.110 The follow-
ing is an overview of aviation's history with volcanic ash, a
description of what occurred when the Eyjafjallaj6kull volcano
erupted, and a discussion of the legal and financial ramifica-
tions of the closure of most of the European airspace for eight
days.
A. THE HISTORY OF AvIATION AND VOLCANIC ASH
Volcanic ash particles "can be highly abrasive and can have
melting temperatures below" the temperatures that typically ex-
ist in airplane engines.111 The particles remain in a solid form
106 Id. at 32,332.
107 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110, 23,110 (Apr.
25, 2011) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pts. 244, 250, 253, 259, 399).
108 Iceland Volcano Eruption of 2010 (Eyjajallajokull Volcano), supra note 2.
109 Id.
110 See EUROCONTROL, ASH-CLOUD OF APRIL AND MAY 2010: IMPACT ON AIR TRAF-
FIc 1 (2010), available at http://www.eurocontrol.int/statfor/gallery/content/
public/documents/Doc394 AshImpact onjTraffic_vl.pdf.
11 See H. Flentje et al., The Eyjajallajdkull Eruption in April 2010-Detection of Vol-
canic Plume Using In-Situ Measurements, Ozone Sondes and Lidar-Ceilometer Profiles,
ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS, June 18, 2010, at 10,085, 10,085, available at
http://www.atmos-chem-phys.net/ 10/ 10085/2010/acp-10-10085-2010.html.
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while suspended in the air;112 however, when the particles come
in contact with the higher temperatures of an airplane's en-
gines, the ash melts, potentially causing engines to seize and
shut down.' 13 Thus, volcanic ash particles can be extremely de-
structive to aircraft. 14 The dangers posed to aircraft by volcanic
ash clouds were discovered and analyzed in the early 1980's.115
On June 24, 1982, with 263 passengers onboard, British Air-
ways Flight 009 took off from London's Heathrow Airport on its
way to New Zealand with stops along the route in India, Malay-
sia, and Australia.' 16 The weather radar was clear as the Boeing
747 flew over the Indonesian city of Jarkarta at an altitude of
over 36,000 feet."17 But, the cockpit and cabin soon began to fill
with heavy sulphuric smoke.' 18 Passengers looking out the win-
dow saw that the jet was covered in a "'brilliant, shimmering
light"' and all four engines of the plane were on fire." 9
As flames burst from the engines, they began to fail one by
one until all four were gone.120 A Boeing 747 can move forward
ten miles every 1,000 feet it falls, and, at this point, Flight 009
had become a glider. 121 Oxygen masks fell from the overheads,
but not all of them worked. 122 In an effort to save those with
faulty masks from oxygen starvation, the captain took a nosedive
and dropped the jet to an altitude where there was enough oxy-
gen in the atmosphere to sustain the passengers and crew. 1 23
The surprising consequence of this action was that one engine
unexpectedly came back to life.' 24 Soon after the plane
dropped to 13,000 feet, the other three engines also began to
112 Ash Properties & Dispersal by Wind, VOLCANIC ASH: EFFECTS & MITIGATION
STRATEGIES, http://volcanoes.usgs.gov/ash/properties.html (last visited Sept. 20,
2011).
113 Simon A. Carn et al., Tracking Volcanic Sulfur Dioxide Clouds for Aviation Haz-
ard Mitigation, 57 NAT. HAZARDS 325, 328 (2008).
114 See id.
115 See id. at 326-27.
116 Zoe Brennan, The Story of BA Flight 009 and the Words Every Passenger Dreads











652 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [76
work, and, although one shut down again, the plane was able to
safely land.1 25
The forensic investigation that followed found that the en-
gines had shut down after flying through a cloud of volcanic
ash. 126 That day, just southeast of Jakarta, Mount Galunggung
erupted, sending "finely ground particles of rock" into the air.
1 27
Volcanic ash plumes are composed of extremely dry material
and are, therefore, unlike other weather systems that can be de-
tected by radar through water particles. 128 When the captain
took the plane into clear, denser air, the volcanic material was
blown free and the engines were able to restart.1 29 The incident
changed aviation training around the world.3 0 Pilots are now
taught to pay attention to signs of a sulphuric smell or smoke as
well as frictional electrification-the brilliant shimmering
light-on the leading edges of the aircraft."'
A similar incident occurred on December 15, 1989, when
KLM Flight 867, bound for Anchorage, Alaska, with 231 passen-
gers onboard, inadvertently flew through a plume of volcanic
ash.13 2  The Redoubt volcano, 115 miles southwest of
Anchorage, began erupting ten hours before the Boeing 747 en-
countered the cloud. 133 All four engines failed, but after the jet
descended from 27,900 feet to 13,300 feet, the crew was able to
restart all the engines and the plane landed safely. 134 Between
1980 and 1997, at least fifteen aircraft utilizing North Pacific air
routes and eighty planes worldwide were damaged after flying








132 CHRISTINA A. NEAL ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY, FACT SHEET 030-97, VOLCANIc ASH-DANGER TO AIRCRAFT IN THE NORTH
PACIFIC (1997), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/fs03O-97/.
133 Id.; Richard Witkin, Jet Lands Safely After Engines Stop in Flight Through Vol-
canic Ash, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 1989), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.
html?res=950DE2D71F3AF935A25751C1A96F948260.
134 NEAL ET AL., supra note 132.
135 Id.
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B. THE EYJAFJALLAJ(KULL ERUPTION
The Eyjafjallaj6kull volcano is located in the south of Ice-
land.1 6 The volcano was relatively dormant for 190 years, but,
in December 2009, enhanced seismic activity began and
culminated in the eruption of the Eyjafjallaj6kull volcano on
March 20, 2010.137 Fire fountains and lava jets were observed
for days, and on April 14, 2010, a major eruption occurred in
the central crater of the volcano. 1 3  Large plumes of volcanic
ash rose 10 kilometers-approximately 33,000 feet-into the sky
and remained there for days.1 39 Northwesterly winds carried the
ash cloud across the northeastern Atlantic to Scandinavia and
the British Islands and then on to Central Europe. 40 As a re-
sult, from April 15-22, 2010, the majority of European airspace
closed.' 41
C. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE TO EYJAFJALLAJOKULL'S ERUPTION
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has es-
tablished widely published international safety protocols, one of
which requires the closure of airspace when volcanic ash levels
in the sky rise above zero. 4 2 As the ash cloud created from
Eyjafjallaj6kull's eruption spread across Europe, European avia-
tion authorities followed ICAO procedure and closed their air-
space.' 4 3 On April 17-18, 2010, seventeen European Union
member states and six non-EU states fully closed their air-
space.144 Two EU member states were partially closed.14 5
The flying bans were instituted by the European Organization
for the Safety of Air Navigation (EuroControl) and were based
on measurements of volcanic ash provided by the Volcanic Ash
Advisory Centre (VAAC).' 46 But even before the bans were





141 EUROCONTROL, supra note 110.
142 Alberto Alemanno, The European Volcanic Ash Crises: Between International and
European Law, AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. INSICHTS, July 13, 2010, at 1, 1, available at http:/
/www.asil.org/insightsl00713.cfm; Paul Marks, Can We Fly Safely Through Volcanic
Ash?, NEW SCIENTIST (Apr. 20, 2010, 5:14 PM), http://www.newscientist.com/arti-
cle/dn18797-can-we-fly-safely-through-volcanic-ash.html.
143 Alemanno, supra note 142.
144 Id. at 1 n.2.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 1.
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lifted, European airlines began criticizing the authorities as be-
ing overly cautious and argued that the model used by VAAC to
measure the ash was "theoretical" and "based on 'probability'
rather than fact. ' 14 7 In Britain, the Met Office-the United
Kingdom's National Weather Service-was criticized by major
British airlines for relying on the VAAC model and making the
U.K. a no-fly zone. 48
Aviation authority spokesmen and airline representatives
stated that given the consequences of blanket airspace closures,
as discussed below, future tests need to be conducted to deter-
mine if a non-zero safe-ash level exists.1 49 Several European air-
lines ran test flights to determine whether the models were
matching reality. 5 ° None allegedly suffered damage.'51 Some
of the test flights had sampling instruments that reported that
there were no ash particles in locations predicated by the mod-
els. 15 2 Some militaryjets, however, flew through ash and did sus-
tain engine damage. 153
In Europe, air traffic control is closely associated with sover-
eignty, which has led to fragmented air traffic management over
European states.' 54 In 2004, legislation known as Single Euro-
pean Sky brought air traffic management under the EU com-
mon transport policy.' 55 The efforts to unify the European sky,
however, have been less than successful. 156 It took five days
before transport ministers from EuroControl member states
conferenced and agreed to a uniform response to the crisis.15 1
New procedures defined zones of danger, with zone I being the
central nucleus of the cloud where full restriction was main-
tained, through zone 3, where there was no ash and, therefore,
147 Id.; Caroline Gammell et al., Volcanic Ash Cloud: Met Office Blamed for Unneces-
sary Six-day Closure, THE TELEGRAPH (Apr. 19, 2010), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/
news/7608.722/Volcanic-ash-cloud-Me t-Office-blamed-for-unnecessary-six-day-
closure.html.
148 Gammell et al., supra note 147.
149 Id.; Marks, supra note 142.




154 Alemanno, supra note 142, at 3.
155 Id.
156 See id.
157 Id. at 2.
654
NEW TARMAC DELAY RULE
no restrictions.1'5 The zoning led to the "'progressive and coor-
dinated opening of European Air Space. ' "1 59
D. CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARSPACE CLOSURE
From April 15 through April 22, more than 100,000 flights
and 10 million passengers were disrupted.'"" Besides Iceland
(where the volcano was located), Finland, Ireland, and the U.K.
were hit the hardest, seeing a 90% reduction in air traffic."' In
Iceland, air traffic was affected for thirteen days-five days
longer than most of Europe.1 2 Over the eight day period, 48%
of flights into and out of Europe were cancelled.'" The worst
day was April 18, when air traffic was down to 20% of normal." 4
The ash plume moved in and out of European airspace and,
consequently, between May 4-17, 2010, an additional 7,000
flights were cancelled. 165
The cancellation of flights not only disrupted passengers, it
also upset global supply routes. 166 The flying ban impacted in-
ternational trade, particularly affecting fast-perishing items. 167
Gross losses sustained by the aviation sector due to lost business
are estimated to be $2.6 billion. 168 It is likely, however, that
some travel, originally cancelled because of airspace closures,
was nevertheless taken, and, thus, the estimated net losses for
the aviation sector are $2.2 billion." 9 It is predicted that larger
losses will be seen by the global hospitality industry, which lost
expenditures on lodging, eateries, transportation, shopping,
and entertainment. 170 While the estimated potential loss of visi-
tor spending is $4.2 billion, spending by stranded travelers likely
offset the impact, and, therefore, the estimated net loss is $1.6
158 Id.
15) Id.
160 EUROCONTROL, supra note 110.
161 Id. at 2.
162 Id.
163 Id. at 7.
164 Id.
165, Id. at 3.
166 THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF AIR TRAVEl, RESTRICTIONS DUE TO VOLCANIC
AsH, OXFORi) ECONOMICS 4 (2010), available at http://www.oxfordeconomics.
com/free/pdfs/volcanicupdate.pdf.
167 Id. at 9.
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billion."'7 The estimated total impact of the airspace closure on
global GDP is approximately $4.7 billion. 172
E. PASSENGER CAUSES OF ACTION
As stated above, nearly 10 million passengers were disrupted
by the volcanic ash plume that caused most of Europe to be a
no-fly zone in mid-April 2010.173 This section discusses the Eu-
ropean Union regulation controlling the treatment and com-
pensation for those passengers.
EU Regulation No 261/2004 (Regulation) "establish[es] com-
mon rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the
event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of
flights."'174 The rules are applicable to passengers flying out of
member states as well as passengers flying into member states
from non-member countries on community carriers. 175 In cases
of cancellation, addressed under Article 5, passengers may be
entitled to reimbursement, rerouting, care (such as meals, re-
freshments, hotel accommodations, etc.), and compensation. 176
In cases of delay, addressed under Article 6, passengers may be
entitled to care, as described above, and in cases of delays over
five hours, reimbursement. 1
77
The Regulation's introduction appears to have a force
majeure clause which states that the obligations imposed on car-
riers "should be limited or excluded in cases where an event has
been caused by extraordinary circumstances which could not
have been avoided even if all reasonable measures had been
taken." 17 Specifically detailed as an extraordinary circumstance
are "meteorological conditions incompatible with the operation
of the flight concerned."' 7 The volcanic ash cloud would cer-
tainly fall under the category of extraordinary circumstances.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 EUJROCONTROL, supra note 110.
1v4 Commission Regulation 261/2004, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 11 February 2004 Establishing Common Rules on Compensation and
Assistance to Passengers in the Event of Denied Boarding and of Cancellation or
Long Delay of Flights, and Repealing Regulation (EEC) No 295/91, 2004 O.J. (L
46) 1, 1.
175 Id.
176 Id. at 4.
177 Id.
178 Id. at 2.
179 Id.
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Article 5, dealing with flight cancellations, also contains a spe-
cific provision stating that "[a]n operating carrier shall not be
obliged to pay compensation ... if it can prove that the cancella-
tion is caused by extraordinary circumstances."''" In contrast,
Article 6, addressing delays, makes no specific mention of releas-
ing air carriers from their obligations in extraordinary circum-
stances.1 8 ' The force majeure clause located in the introduction
section could be interpreted to apply to the Regulation as a
whole or interpreted as a reinforcement of only those articles
that specifically contain such a provision. If the latter, it could
be argued that carriers are, under certain delay circumstances,
required to provide meals and refreshments, hotel accommoda-
tions, and transport between the airport and place of accommo-
dation free of charge, regardless of any exigent circumstances.
Several articles speaking to passenger rights in light of the vol-
canic ash situation interpret the Regulation to still impose delay
obligations of care.' As of now, it does not appear that any
passengers have brought actions against airlines for violations of
the Regulation. It is, however, possible that suits are pending
but have not yet reached a disposition.
Passengers flying from non-EU airports on non-EU carriers
will not be covered by the Regulation. 83 Those individuals
could potentially be covered by the particular airline on which
they are flying, depending on the terms and conditions of their
ticketing contract.'84 Additionally, passengers covered by travel
insurance could submit claims for expenses to their insurer.
85
Certain insurance companies, however, have already refused to
compensate stranded passengers by invoking the "Act of God"
clause and arguing that the erupting volcano was not an insura-
ble event.8  Another option for passengers who paid for their
travel by credit card would be to submit a claim under section 75
180 Id. at 4.
181 Id.
182 See, e.g., Sue Barham, Volcanic Ash Flight Disruption-Passenger Rights, BARLOW
LvDE & Giui-ERT (Apr. 15, 2010), http://www.blg.co.uk/publications/briefing_
notes/volcanic-ash-flight disruption.aspx; Kevin Peachey, Iceland Volcano: Air
Passenger Rights, BBC NEws (May 18, 2010), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/busi-
ness/8621779.stm.
183 See Craig Moore, Volcanic Ash Travel Claims-Who Pays When the Dust Settles?,
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of the Consumer Credit Act of 1974, which covers losses for
goods and services not supplied within a given value range. 117
F. BUSINESS CAUSES OF ACTION
Many European and British airlines denounced governmental
authorities for closing European airspace and have publicly indi-
cated that they believe the authorities were negligent in using a
"probability" model to determine their decisions. 8' In fact,
British Airways already requested financial restitution from the
British government and European Union for making Europe a
no-fly zone when test flights showed no danger to normal
flights.' 8" The logical next question is whether a state can be
held liable for airlines' or other industries' loss of business due
to the closure of airspace.
It appears that, while multiple articles were written about the
ash cloud itself as well as passenger rights in light of the airspace
closure,"1 little has been written on the topic of states' liability.
In the United Kingdom, "a public body acting ultra vires is as
liable for an act committed beyond its powers as is a private indi-
vidual."""9 There are three possible causes of action under
which a plaintiff might bring a suit against a public entity: (1) "a
breach of statutory duty without the necessity to prove careless-
ness;" (2) "a common law breach of duty of care resulting from
a breach of a statutory duty or a performance of a duty;" and (3)
"misfeasance in a public office."' 19 2 Claims asserted under a so-
cial interest statute, intended to benefit society in general,
would not typically give rise to a cause of action for breach of
duty unless the plaintiff could prove negligence.19 Addition-
ally, courts are not permitted to impose their judgment on dis-
cretionary authority, and the discretion of the state can only be
attacked if the plaintiff shows manifest unreasonableness on the
part of the authority.'94
187 Id.
188 E.g., Gammell et al., supra note 147.
189 Ruwantissa Abeyratne, Responsibility and Liability Aspects of the Icelandic Vol-
canic Eruption, 35 AIR & SPACE L. 281, 285 (2010).
190 See, e.g., id.; Alemanno, supra note 142; Barham, supra note 182; Gammell et
al., supra note 147.
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193 Id. at 287.
194 Id.
658
NEW TARMAC DELAY RULE
Under the Convention on International Civil Aviation, it is
the duty of the state to ensure the safety of the flights, passen-
gers, and crews that utilize its airspace, and it is the right and
responsibility of a state to close its airspace in emergency situa-
tions.115 Given aviation's history with volcanic ash, it seems
highly unlikely that the decision to close European airspace,
even if based on a theoretical model, could be considered mani-
festly unreasonable.
G. MOUNT MERAPI
The Ejafjallajokull volcano in Iceland was not the only vol-
canic eruption to disturb airspace and halt air traffic in 2010. In
late October and early November of 2010, Mount Merapi, lo-
cated in Indonesia, began erupting.196 As ash plumes rose into
the sky, international airlines cancelled flights in and out of
Jakarta. 197 Eighty-six flights were cancelled from November 6-7,
2010.9 On November 8, 2010, normal flights resumed.199
While the impact of these closures has not yet been analyzed,
Yogyakarta is considered by some to be "one of Indonesia's most
important touristic and cultural cities," and, thus, the closure of
Yogyakarta's Adisucipto International Airport is likely to have
had a huge impact on that region of Indonesia. °°
H. CONCLUSION
Given the drastic effects of airspace closures, it certainly ap-
pears to be true that improvements need to be made in Eu-
rope's airspace closure decision-making process. History,
however, has shown that airplanes and volcanic ash do not mix,
and, thus, until a better method is developed, it is better to close
airspace than to risk the possible loss of lives.
195 Id. at 283, 285.
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I. CONCLUSION
April 2010 brought changes and unique challenges to both
the domestic and international aviation industry. "'If you learn
one thing from having lived through decades of changing views,
it is that all predictions are necessarily false."' 20 1 The predic-
tions that the TDR would cause more harm than good have yet
to play out. In fact, early data indicates that those predictions
might never come true. Additionally, even though they were
based on a scientific model, the VAAC's predictions as to the
location of volcanic ash particles have been denounced as faulty
and potentially causing unnecessary losses in the billions of dol-
lars. In light of all this, predictions about the future of tarmac
delay rules or the development of alternative procedures for the
closure of European airspace will not be made. What will be
said is that there is a lot to learn about each subject, and infor-
mation obtained in the future will lead to a clearer perspective
on both topics.
201 Linda Grace-Kobas, Honored Literary Scholar M.H. Abrams Continues His La-
bors (of Love), CORNELL UNIV. (June 10, 1999), http://www.news.cornell.edu/
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